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CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY* AND SECTION 1983: A
RESPONSE
PAUL N. Cox**t
The traditional and perhaps the principal function of legal texts
is to provide a conceptual structure against which the law governing
a particular subject matter may be understood.' The writer of texts,
it is hoped (or at least was hoped in the era in which faith in rules
was uncontroversial) creates a coherent fabric out of the chaos of
the cases.2 To that service deference to the demand for practical
relevance has recently been added. And so we find sample pleadings
and helpful hints. There is, of course, no harm in such insertions if
the intellectual demands of the principal task are observed. Logical
(or at least rational) structure and order remain, however, the prin-
cipal tasks, and these are valuable services to perform.
Professor Nahmod has performed these services with some suc-
cess in his recent book on Section 1983 3-the statute creating a
federal cause of action for the so-called "constitutional tort" com-
mitted "under color" of state law. He has a measure of success
because his choice of subject matter implicitly recognizes the impor-
*See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION (1979);
Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974).
**Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University.
tThe opinions expressed here are my own. I nevertheless wish to thank my
colleagues, John Farago, Ivan Bodensteiner, Rosalie Levinson, and David Vandercoy
for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Responsibility for error is of course
mine.
1. Certainly classification, distinction and structure-the making of
coherence out of the chaos of the cases-marked the great era of American law text
writing in the nineteenth century and were, despite the obvious problems thought to
have been generated, the chief contribution of Blackstone's Commentaries. For an in-
teresting account of the process and its influence see White, The Intellectual Origins
of Torts in America, 86 YALE L.J. 671 (1977), reprinted in G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (1978).
2. It is clear that faith in rules has never been wholly forsaken despite the
force of the argument against it. E.g., Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict
of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928). At least it is clear if one, taking an empirical tack,
reviews the current catalog of any reputable law publisher.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The book is S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION (1979).
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tance of the cause of action as a subject of inquiry independent of
the constitutional provisions it purports to enforce. The book never-
theless fails. It fails not from failure to satisfy its apparent objec-
tive-to provide a framework and explanation of the current law of
the statute-for it at least adequately describes the cases within an
arguably accurate analytical structure. Rather, the book fails
because it does not provide us with a viable conception of the cause
of action and because its central conceptual offering-"constitutional
duty" - constitutes merely a description of the failure of the courts
to provide us with such a conception.
These are of course only charges. In seeking to substantiate
them, this critique initially outlines the judicial failure and proposes
criteria for a minimally acceptable conceptual framework for section
1983. The critique then suggests an alternative to "constitutional duty"
by questioning the generally accepted proposition that the Constitu-
tion regulates the unauthorized conduct of government officials and
by arguing that Section 1983 should itself be identified as the source
of the federal "duties" imposed upon individual officials.
ON THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING AN APPROPRIATE ANALYSIS
Section 1983 is the basis for almost every case of constitutional
importance involving the states and their political subdivisions. The
underlying theory and implications of the cause of action it creates
are properly the subjects of a growing body of scholarly discourse.'
Recently, the statute has become the subject of a judicial concern
with its relationship to the tort law of the states.5
The discourse and the concern reflect a recurring and funda-
mental difficulty in the application of the statute. The difficulty evi-
dent in the cases is that of unstated shifting reference, for it has
4. Articles of particular value are Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal
Jurisdiction" A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal
Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORDER 557; Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property:
Federal Common Law and Section 1983, 51 So. CAL. L. REV. 355 (1978); Levine, The
Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L.J. 1483 (1977); McCormick,
Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Protections, 60 VA. L. REv. 1 (1974); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of
Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974); Neuman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87
YALE L.J. 447 (1978); Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw.U.L. REV. 277 (1965); Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983
and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
5. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976).
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never been made clear whether the courts are rendering constitu-
tional, statutory or federal common law decisions.' Applications of
the statute after Monroe v. Pape7 display a tension between two
views of the cause of action. The first treats both the question of
liability for damages and the issues of policy relevant to that ques-
tion8 at a statutory or interstitial federal common law level of
analysis.' The second view treats the question and those issues at a
purportedly constitutional level of analysis.'0 Thus, there are cases
6. For examples of shifting judicial positions on how questions of blame-
worthiness of conduct are to be treated-as issues of constitutional meaning, affir-
mative defense, or common law elements of the cause of action-see the "constitu-
tional false imprisonment" cases: Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Williams v.
Anderson, 599 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1979); Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 865 (1976); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 901 (1969). For an example of lack of clarity of analysis, see Bonner v. Coughlin,
545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1977).
Professor Nahmod appears to recognize at least a part of this difficulty in his
criticism of the judicial tendency to confuse elements of the cause of action with affir-
mative defenses. S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 64. Nahmod suggests that "negligence"
is an issue only in the context of the affirmative defense of "good faith immunity"
unless negligence is relevant, at a constitutional level of analysis, to the question of
constitutional violation. Id. However, negligence may be treated either as an element
of the prima facie case or as a question of affirmative defense without giving the
negligence concept a constitutional basis. Assuming an initial decision that liability for
negligence would serve the purposes underlying the statute, the decision is a policy
choice governed by such considerations as the court's perception of the relative ease of
access to evidence. The burden of proof question generally has been resolved by the
Court in favor of plaintiffs as a matter of interstitial federal common law making. See
Gomez v. Toledo, __ U.S. ., 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980).
7. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
8. For a framework describing such policies at common law, see Green, The
Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928); 29 COLUM. L. REV.
255 (1929).
9. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 717 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("abuse of power"
as an element of the statute); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (interpreting the
statute to require merely the tort standard which "makes a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions"); Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 571, 574-76 (7th
Cir. 1976) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1977); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d
781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Shapo, Constitutional Tort, supra note
4, at 298 (courts have failed to identify the "types of harm against which the statute
protects." (emphasis supplied)); Id. at 326-27 (noting that Monroe signaled the develop-
ment of a federal common law and suggesting an "outrageous" conduct requirement as
a matter of statutory interpretation). The immunity defense cases may also be cited as
examples. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 355 (1978); O'Conner v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 470 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (Congress, by
enacting Section 1983, did not intend to abrogate "common law" immunities).
10. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376-77 (1976). Compare Justice Brennan's dissent-
19811
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in which a court merely borrows a common law cause of action and
treats it as the federal cause of action without citing the constitu-
tional provision violated," and there are cases in which a court in-
vokes common law concepts or policies of questionable constitutional
origin and attaches constitutional labels. 2 The "state of mind" of the
individual purportedly violating the Constitution under color of
state law-as addressed by the courts in its various incarna-
tions"l-is a constitutional element in one case," ' a common law or
statutory element in another, 5 and both in a third."
The two views are more fundamentally reflected in judicial at-
tempts even to describe the cause of action. We have repeatedly
been told that the statute creates a "species of tort liability,"'7 but
the "species" has not been adequately identified. We have been told
ing opinion in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 717 (1976) (arguing that the statute is con-
cerned with abuse of power) with Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 COR-
NELL L. REV. 405, 428 (1977) (arguing that abuse of power or authority is a constitu-
tional requirement for liability). And compare id. at 413 ("outrageousness" standard at
constitutional level of analysis) and Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S-. 137, 147-48 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (same) with Shapo, Tort, supra note 4, at 327
(outrageousness standard at statutory level of analysis).
11. See, e.g., Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 429 U.S.
865 (1976); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
12. See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 932 (1978); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970); Stringer v.
Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
13. See S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 59-77 (using "state of mind" to describe
intent, negligence and variations of both); Kirkpatrick, Defining A Constitutional Tort
Under Section 1983: The State of Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 45 (1977). It
should be noted that it is possible to voice significant disagreement with the "state of
mind" label, particularly but not exclusively as applied in the commentary under
discussion to negligence. See, e.g., 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.1
(1956); PROSSER, TORTS 16-17 (4th ed. 1971); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG.
STUD. 29, 31 (1972). But see Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908).
The Supreme Court has twice granted certiorari to decide whether negligence
is actionable under Section 1983. (It js not clear if the Court was questioning whether
negligence is actionable as a matter of statute or whether, as Professor Nahmod seems
to suggest, negligence is sufficient to violate particular constitutional provisions. S.
NAHMOD supra note 3, at 60). Nevertheless, in both cases, the Court avoided the issue.
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). It
appears, however, that the issue might be reached this term. Parratt y. Taylor, No.
79-1734 (U.S. 1980).
14. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
16. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 n.1 (1979).
17. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690-95 (1978); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978); Imbler v. Pactman, 424 U.S.
409, 417 (1976).
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as well that the species protects federal interests distinct from and
potentially inconsistent with'8 the interests protected by state tort
law, but judicial attempts to identify these distinct interests have
not been convincing. The attempts suggest, rather, a desperate ef-
fort to distinguish constitutional tort from state tort. The effort is
made both by resort to the notion that the degree of blameworthi-
ness of individual conduct somehow constitutes the subject of con-
stitutional concern 9 and by removing, through tortured renderings
of precedent, previously protected interests from the judicial list of
constitutional concerns.0 The attempts, although often framed in
terms of constitutional interpretation, reflect an analysis influenced
by policy issues -particularly those of judicial administration and of
the federal court management of federal-state relationships" -that
are not linked by coherent theory to the constitutional provisions
purportedly "interpreted."
A few examples should be sufficient to illustrate the point. In
Estelle v. Gamble,' where "deliberate indifference" was adopted as
18. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173 (1961). Cf. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394 (1971)
(implied cause of action).
19. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1978). It is conceded that Estelle
is not without constitutional precedent, Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459 (1947), but Justice Stevens' dissenting insight deserves to be taken seriously:
"Subjective motivation may well determine what, if any remedy is appropriate against
a particular defendant. However, whether the constitutional standard has been
violated should turn on the character of the punishment rather than the motivation of
the individual who inflicted it." 479 U.S. at 116.
20. Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) with Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). For criticism of the Paul opinion on the basis of its misuse
of precedent, see, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 10, at 405; Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist. A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 325-28 (1977).
21. One may make a structural argument for the constitutional origin of the
policy underlying Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), or even for the rather strange
application of Younger principles in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), but it is at
best difficult to conclude that the Congress could not modify the policies adopted by
the Court in these cases. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
152-56 (1978). See also Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis a Vis The States: The
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977). But see Farago, Function
Without Form: The Asymmetrical Herneneutics of Jesse Choper, 15 Val. U. L. Rev.
605, 621-30 (1981) (criticizing Professor Choper's argument, repeated in J. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171-205 (1980)). Section 1983, of
course, is a statute. As such, it is subject to statutory interpretation (even statutory
interpretation informed by a concern with federalism). On the question of "federalism"
as a limitation upon the meaning of constitutional provisions -particularly upon grants
of power to Congress -see note 65 infra.
22. 429 U.S. 97 (1978).
1981]
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a constitutional standard in cases of official neglect of a prisoner's
medical needs, the Court's opinion was permeated with a judicial
fear that a lesser standard would create a federal law of medical
malpractice.23 In Rizzo v. Goode,24 the Court inappropriately applied
the rationale of Younger v. Harris25 to executive conduct while sug-
gesting that there is no "constitutional duty" of supervision.' That
opinion's concern with federalism as a limitation upon the remedial
authority of federal courts was therefore linked to a problem of
substantive constitutional obligation. And in Paul v. Davis,' the
Court concluded that personal reputation is not a constitutionally
protected interest. Here the opinion is devoted in substantial
measure to an expression of fear of a general federal tort law.28
The phenomena just described-analyses which shift without
warning and without disclosure from tort to Constitution to judicial
administration and back again-requires explanation. The needed
explanation would be what I would term "a viable conception of the
cause of action." The described phenomena suggests the criteria by
which any proposed conception may be measured. First, it must ex-
plain the relationship between the statute and the particular con-
stitutional provision invoked in a lawsuit brought under the statute.
Second, it must explain the relevance of constitutional provisions in-
voked against government action to the federal regulation of the in-
dividual conduct of government actors.
If these criteria are accepted, the immediate problem is to
measure Professor Nahmod's conceptual offering against them. It
should be initially understood that there is substantial judicial and
academic support for Nahmod's argument that the fundamental in-
quiry in a "constitutional tort" action is that of the individual
defendant's "constitutional duty."' Moreover, his earlier explication
of that theory0 has clearly influenced judicial decision."
23. Id. at 106.
24. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
25. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger rationale was founded upon deference to
state judicial forums, not state government in general. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 156 (1978); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, 17 FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 552 (1978).
26. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. at 376-77. See note 66 infra.
27. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
28. Id at 698-99.
29. There is at least support in the sense that the decisions are consistent
with the conception. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362 (1976). See note 31 infra.
30. Nahmod, supra note 4.
31. See, e.g., Bonner v. Couglin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1318 n.21 (7th Cir. 1975) (opin-
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Constitutional duty, despite the constitutional label, is a con-
cept that appears to be largely borrowed from Dean Leon Green's
common law tort theories.2 As the concept was at least initially
ion of then Circuit Judge Stevens), modified, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1977). It has influenced other commentators as well. See,
e.g., Kirkpatrick, supra note 13, at 67 n.120.
32. See L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW (1965) (collecting
Dean Green's law review articles). For a general explanation of Green's duty-risk
theories, see Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational
Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1. Nahmod's debt
to Green is evident despite Nahmod's insistence that "tort concepts" are not "deter-
minative" in 1983 actions. S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 61; Nahmod, supra note 4, at 23
n.80. What, precisely, Nahmod means is not clear, but his theory appears to have at
least two, possibly three, components. One is a rejection of "proximate cause" in favor
of a determination of the scope of liability by the judge. This component directly
tracks Green, and is a component with which I am in full agreement. The second com-
ponent is that state law should not be automatically adopted as the rule of decision
because federal interests and policies are at stake. There is little to disagree with
here, at least if one is not too dogmatic about the proposition. But see Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976). If there is a third component or, perhaps, alternative meaning, of
the notion that "tort concepts" are not determinative, it is that the Constitution pro-
vides alternative concepts-in some form distinct from "tort concepts"-with which to
resolve cases which involve the allocation of harm as between individuals factually con-
nected to the harm. It is with this potential meaning that I am in disagreement.
The argument that Section 1983 preserves "public" rather that "private" in-
terests and therefore creates a cause of action distinct from tort, Howell v. Cataldi,
464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972), may have validity in the sense that there may be a deter-
rence policy underlying the statute, but it is not correct that the interests preserved
by the cause of action are not personal. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). The
rationale underlying a cause of action for damages for constitutional deprivation is
compensation for deprivation of personal interests, not enforcement of a public in-
terests through the incentive of a private remedy. Id. Cf Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (implied cause of action).
The argument that the statute regulates a relationship distinct from that
regulated by state tort law, Neuborne, The Procedural Assault on the Warren Legacy:
A Study of Repeal By Indirection, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 406, 433 (1977), is viable to the
extent it refers to the necessity for "state action" and, possibly, to the extent that the
fact of "state action" makes the harm suffered different in kind from similar harm suf-
fered in the absence of some indicia of government involvement. Expectations of
government regularity and rationality are invaded. McCormack, supra note 4, at 9-10.
But it is at best difficult to accept the proposition that Section 1983 regulates the
distinct relationship between state and citizen by requiring an individual government
official to pay damages for conduct violative both of constitutional guarantee and state
law or policy. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202-259 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). What is regulated in such an instance is a relationship between in-
dividuals. One of those individuals is "clothed" with state granted-power, and that f6ct
invokes policy concerns (running in often inconsistent directions) not present in the
usual automobile accident case, but the relationship remains individual. On the general
question of the relationship between tort and constitutional tort, see generally Carey
1981]
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developed by Nahmod, it requires an analysis under which both the
requisite "constitutional standard of conduct" and the particular
defendant's "constitutional duty" are determined by reference to
"constitutional policy" and by constitutional interpretation.e
In his more recent work, Professor Nahmod appropriately cites
in support of the constitutional duty concept federal court opinions
that purport to focus on questions of the scope of constitutional pro-
tection or that treat "state of mind" elements of the cause of action
as compelled as a matter of constitutional interpretation. According
to Nahmod, an inquiry into a defendant's state of mind properly
focuses on "the constitutional question"' where "state of mind is
relevant to the constitutional violation."35 He therefore undertakes a
review of cases decided under distinct constitutional provisions to
determine the "state of mind" necessary to their violationA with the
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Glennon, supra note 4; Levine, supra note 4; Note, 93
HARV. L. REv. 966 (1980).
33. Nahmod, supra note 4, at 13.
34. S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 63 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)). For another explicit treatment of
state of mind as the crucial question in applying different constitutional provisions see
Kirkpatrick, supra note 13.
35. S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 64.
36. S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at §§ 3.03-3.11. Professor Nahmod labels this an
inquiry into "basis of liability." If that label is intended to distinguish the inquiry from
the constitutional duty notion, the distinction is unstated. I have interpreted "basis of
liability" as the other side of a duty coin. See S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 60. Nahmod,
to his credit, recognizes that the courts have not explained why the relevance of state
of mind varies with the constitutional provision in issue. S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at
63. As his conception nevertheless clearly incorporates the Court's position, I do not
interpret his position as inconsistent with the notions either that state of mind is rele-
vant or that it varies with the provision in issue.
Despite the language employed in the cases supporting Nahmod's arguments
regarding appropriate state of mind (or blameworthiness of conduct) elements for par-
ticular constitutional provisions, it is possible to read those cases as instances of in-
terstitial common law making within the framework of the statute and, therefore, as
statements of statutory rather than constitutional duty.
The distinction in approach which would be imposed by the latter reading is
suggested by comparing Judge Swygert's dissenting opinion in Bonner v. Coughlin,
545 F.2d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1977), with the majority's
opinion in that case. Bonner involved a claim by a prisoner that the negligence of
prison guards in leaving the prisoner's cell door open exposed a trial transcript to
theft, thus depriving the prisoner of property without "due process." The majority in
Bonnet argued, among other things, that there is no due process protection against
"negligence." 545 F.2d at 566-67. Judge Swygert argued that a negligence inquiry
warps the analysis. Nahmod suggests that Swygert meant that negligence is sufficient
to make out a due process claim. S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 65. I suggest this is a
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 [1981], Art. 1
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caveat that a different state of mind -for example, gross negligence
rather than intents7-may be sufficient in "different situations."'
As a conception, constitutional duty suggests two answers to
the explanations demanded of it here. First, the relationship be-
tween the statute and the Constitution is largely one of fusion. The
statute is mere vehicle. 9 The Constitution provides, apparently
within the four corners of the instrument, the policies necessary to a
determination of its legal consequences. To this conception there is
an exception-for the good faith defenses obviously express policies
material to liability not derived from the instrument-but the
defenses are only an exception. 0 In short, the Constitution may ap-
misreading. Judge Swygert's point was that an inquiry into intent or negligence is the
wrong inquiry:
The en banc majority ...holds that Bonner's interest in his transcript
was not a protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment because, it
asserts, that amendment does not protect interests which are violated
through mere negligence. This holding is illogical. Whether Bonner's in-
terest in his transcript is a protected right is completely unrelated to
whether the agency that impaired that interest did so intentionally or
negligently. The Fourteenth Amendment protects deprivations [sic] of
"life, liberty or property, without due process of law." In determining
whether Bonner had a protected right, the sole question to be decided is
whether the loss of the transcript falls within any of those categories.
Bonner still will not be able to prove a section 1983 violation unless he
can show that the state was involved in the impairment of his interests.
But that is a separate inquiry, irrelevant to whether a protected right of
the plaintiff is at stake. 545 F.2d at 571.
Judge Swygert concluded that a defendant's conduct should be analyzed within the
context of the under color of state law element of the statute under a "misuse of
power" standard and that negligence could in some instances constitute such a misuse
of power. 545 F.2d at 574-76.
37. S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 67.
38. Id. at 76.
39. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization 441 U.S. 600, 617
(1979).
40. Although Professor Nahmod seeks to separate "duty" from the affir-
mative defenses, S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 64, the latter seem to be, at least initial-
ly, clearly statements of "duty." The affirmative defense label is chiefly useful for'
allocating burden of proof (or, at least, of pleading). See Gomez v. Toledo, - U.S.
-, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980) and note 6 supra. It is obvious, however, that affirmative
defenses are statements of statutory or interstitial federal common law duty. They ex-
press an antecedent judicial analysis of relevant policies: policies of avoiding unfairness
to executive officials, of avoiding inhibition of beneficial official action and of avoiding
deterrence of public service. These policies are expressed by means of a malice or
knowledge culpability standard. See generally Freed, Executive Immunity For Con-
stitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 526, 563 (1977).
The Monroe opinion, and the cases which speak in terms of the statute requiring or
not requiring particular states of mind or degrees of culpability, may be interpreted as
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parently be viewed under the constitutional duty conception as itself
generating and defining the individual duty of individual officials to
particular others."'
Second, the relevance of the constitutional provision invoked in
a Section 1983 action to the federal regulation of individual conduct
is that it defines the regulation. The constitutional duty conception
expressions of a similar analysis within the framework of the prima facie case.
Monroe's intent standard was adopted to further the compensatory purposes of the
statute.
Professor Nahmod's contention that constitutional duties must be identified,
may be interpreted, contrary to the interpretation suggested in the above text, as re-
quiring examination of policies relevant to liability in defining "constitutional duty."
This interpretation suggests a fusion of constitutional and statutory issues without an-
ticipating answers to liability questions solely from the Constitution itself. Nahmod has
argued, for example, that deterrence is a primary objective of the federal remedy.
Nahmod, supra note 4, at 10-11. If what is meant is that deterrence must be considered
in defining a given defendant's "constitutional duty" to a particular plaintiff, it may be
assumed that a remedial policy-that of deterrence of constitutional deprivation-is to
be considered. It is not clear, however, that this is what is meant, for Professor
Nahmod's 1974 article also speaks in terms of constitutional policy and constitutional
interpretation in defining constitutional duties-a suggestion which at least implies
that constitutional duties are matters not of remedial policy but of constitutional com-
pulsion. Id. See also NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 62-64.
Since Professor Nahmod does not identify what constitutional policies he con-
siders relevant to a definition of duty, it is difficult to determine how those policies are
thought to control the liability of different potential defendants. Some guidance,
however, is provided by his rejection of negligence as a basis for liability. Nahmod,
supra note 4, at 21-22. If it is assumed that this conclusion is founded upon constitu-
tional interpretation, it appears that constitutional policy forces a restrictive view of
the persons with some factual connection to an unreasonable search and seizure who
are potential defendants. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376 (1976) (no "constitu-
tional duty" to supervise). If remedial policies play a meaningful role in defining con-
stitutional duty, a different conclusion may be reached. Cf. Owen v. City of In-
dependence, 445 U.S. 622, (1980) (city has no good faith defense where it "causes" con-
stitutional deprivation within meaning of the statute).
Professor Nahmod recognizes both deterrence and compensation as policies
underlying the Section 1983 damages remedy. Both policies are conceptually distinct
from the constitutional provisions enforced by that remedy. It is apparent, for exam-
ple, that the fourth amendment does not, except as a matter of its authority, deter
unreasonable searches; rather, the remedies provided for its enforcement deter such
searches. Cf. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135-39 (1978) (exclusionary rule). If
these remedial policies may be considered in defining duty, it is possible to justify the
liability of other persons, in addition to those whose conduct involved intentional or
grossly negligent infliction of harm. The "duty" in question would, however, be a
statutory or common law duty, not a constitutional duty.
41. Cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island Rd. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (com-
mon law tort duty runs to particular plaintiff). The reference is necessarily implied in
Nahmod's rejection of proximate cause, a rejection with which I am in accord.
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clearly suggests, because the statute is mere vehicle, that the Con-
stitution speaks directly to individual government actors by means
of standards of conduct derived, again with the exception of the
defenses, from the instrument. What were earlier perceived here as
shifts in reference from tort to Constitution to constitutionally ex-
traneous policy are, under Nahmod's conception, apparently not pre-
sent at all or, if present, can and should be eliminated by an ex-
clusive reference to constitutional meaning. 2
These answers are not, of course, Professor Nahmod's answers.
Professor Nahmod did not, at least expressly, ask these particular
questions. They are, I think, nonetheless implicit in "constitutional
duty" as a concept. They are, moreover, the responses of a dominant
conception of Section 1983 I propose to attack shortly. That concep-
tion seeks to make constitutional guarantees answer questions about
individual liability in concrete cases. It is a conception suggested by
an insistence that "state of mind" is constitutionally derivable and
is, albeit certainly never in pure form, a conception which runs
through the cases cited here. I think it wrong for two reasons. First,
it is far from clear that any constitutional guarantee provides
significant guidance in resolving the question of who will bear risks
of loss or harm generated by the conduct of individual officials. Nor
are there identifiable "constitutional policies" which will inform
analysis of that question."3 Second, it is even less apparent that
42. An analogous notion is reflected in the work of certain of Professor
Monaghan's critics, particularly with respect to the Bivens remedy assertable against
federal officers. Compare Monaghan, Forewor& Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975) with Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1135 (1978). See also Schrock & Welsh, Up From
Calandra, The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV.
251 (1974). I do not read Professor Monaghan's recent criticism of the common law
method in constitutional adjudication as a disaffirmance of his earlier explanation of
Bivens. Monaghan, Professor Jones and the Constitution, 4 VT. L. REV. 87, 93 n.24
(1979).
43. Candor requires an attempt, nevertheless, to suggest reasons for the view
that constitutional guarantees do provide such guidance. The attraction of the constitu-
tional level of analysis is that it suggests that constitutional rights do not exist as
abstractions but are given meaning only in concrete cases in which a court concludes
that there has been a breach of a correlative duty. See McCormick, supra note 4, at 4.
Stated perhaps more brutally, there is no constitutional right if there is no liability.
See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution As A Sword, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1532, 1540 (1972); Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality
and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1968). Moreover,
there is an historical attraction to the vieh: It is consistent with the notion that the
Constitution is law and was originally conceived as both a part of, and enforceable
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"states of mind" are derivable from constitutional uarantees or
essential to their operation." The balance of this review will be
through, the mechanisms of the common law. See Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1159 (1969).
The attraction of the theory that a court should define a constitutional duty
derived from constitutional policy and constitutional interpretation in every case, and
the attraction of the theory that "state of mind" requirements may be derived from
constitutional provisions, is that both theories seek to make constitutional limitations
upon state power speak to the individual officials who exercise that power. The dif-
ficulty is that constitutional limitations do not speak to individuals; they speak to
governments. See notes 48-52 infra and accompanying text.
44. Of course Professor Nahmod is not alone in emphasizing "state of mind"
elements in constitutional adjudication, and judicial emphasis upon "state of mind" in
at least the broad sense is not unique to damages actions under Section 1983. See, e.g.,
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Village of Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Housing Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1 (1944); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). It seems clear that there is some distinction between "intent"
in the tort sense in which it has been used by Nahmod and others, e.g., Kirkpatrick,
supra note 13, and the "basis for decision" sense in which motivation analysis uses the
term. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). However, the dif-
ferences need not be thought important for the purpose of distinguishing "motivation
theory."
The commentary is voluminous, and, although there have been allusions to
across-the-board insistence upon inquiry into motivation, Clark, Legislative Motivation
and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 (1978);
Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1976), most have focused upon equal protection doc-
trine, an area in which, possibly with the addition of some first amendment issues, the
rationale for motivation analysis seems most clearly viable. See, e.g., Brest, Foreword-
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Eisenberg,
Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication,
52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Con-
stitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST,
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 145 (1980); Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motiva-
tion Analysis, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155, 1161 (1978); Karst, The Costs of Motive-
Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163 (1978). But see Eisenberg, Reflections
On a Unified Theory of Motive, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1147, 1152 n.23 (1978).
The point made here is not an attack upon "motive theory" as such. The point,
rather, is to confine motive inquiry at a constitutional level to the rationales for such
an inquiry and to reject any attempt, under color of constitutional motive analysis, to
impose state of mind requirements not founded upon such rationales. Cf. J. ELY, supra
at 145 (motive is immaterial where there is a constitutional "right" in issue; it is
material only where basis for decision is the subject of constitutional regulation). In
particular, the point is to reject the constitutional label for state of mind requirements
imposed in fact for reasons (particularly reasons of "federalism" and of judicial
management of dockets) not related to thd policies underlying the constitutional provi-
sion at stake in any given case. For examples of suspected labeling, see, e.g., Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
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devoted to a defense of these doubts and of their implication: the
relevant "duty" in a Section 1983 cause of action against an in-
dividual government official is a statutory duty and the analysis of
that duty should be clearly identified as a statutory analysis.
THE ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM: OF INDIVIDUALS AND GOVERNMENTS
To the extent that there presently exists any judicial concep-
tion that satisfactorily explains the cause of action, it is suggested
by the surviving 5 holdings in Monroe v. Pape'": individual govern-
ment actors may be found liable under the statute for a deprivation
of constitutional right even where their conduct was neither
authorized nor prohibited by the government that "clothed" 7 them
with authority and power; plaintiffs need not exhaust state remedies
as a prerequisite to pursuit of the federal remedy; and a common
law conception of intent may be made an element of the cause of ac-
tion in at least the context of a fourth amendment deprivation. The
major implications of these holdings are clear: The Constitution
speaks, or may be made to speak, to individuals. The government's
policy stance is, at least where inconsistent with the individual's
conduct, immaterial. Common law tort concepts play some role in
formulating the federal remedy.
There are two difficulties with these implications. First, it is
not clear when or at what level of analysis tort concepts are rele-
vant. Although in Monroe "intent" was invoked as a matter of the
.interpretation of the statute,'8 in later cases, as Professor Nahmod's
analysis correctly suggests, state of mind has been deemed a matter
of constitutional importance."' Second, constitutional guarantees do
not speak to individuals, they speak to governments.' A constitu-
U.S. 97 (1976); Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
932 (1977).
45. See Monell v. New York City Dept. Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
46. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
47. Id. at 184 (quoting from United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325 (1941):
"Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under color of
state law.").
48. 365 U.S. at 187: "Section [1983] should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."
49. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976).
50. This claim is, of course, controversial and largely inconsistent with con-
trolling case law. See authorities cited note 56, infra. The commentators display some
ambivalence on the question. Compare Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 1109, 1146 (1969) with Id at 1147. See Hart, The Relations Between State and
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tional level of analysis takes into account, by means of a balancing
test, or a rationality test, or a compelling interest test, the govern-
mental interests that underlie the challenged action or policy.
Where the focus of inquiry is upon an individual, albeit an individual
in government clothing, the individual can often cite no government
interest as justification for his conduct.5 ' Where a government in-
terest is present, it can be cited only vicariously. That the individual
official cannot in every instance claim that a government interest
underlies his conduct suggests that there are distinct categories of
cases. In some, the individual official merely provides the occasion
for a constitutional decision regarding the validity of government
conduct or policy and the analysis will take a constitutional form.52
In at least some others, the sole reason for judicial inquiry is in-
dividual conduct unrelated to governmental interest or policy, and
the link to federal concern arises solely from the fact of government
clothing. In the latter type of case, the analysis will likely be framed
in terms of abuse of power and will not, except perhaps by virtue of
labels, take constitutional form. 53 A third category includes cases
where both governmental interests and individual conduct are
potential candidates for analysis; the analysis employed may display
elements of both preceding categories.'
There is, however, an additional and crucial dimension to the
problem. It is apparent that constitutional guarantees are concerned
with safeguarding private interests that are protected as well by
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 521-24 (1954); Levine, supra note 4, at 1487-91.
But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1162 n.15 (1978).
The term "government" will be used here to avoid extended discussion of the
distinctions between federal government (to which the statute does not apply), state
government (to which it does in a sense apply, but with substantial distinctions
generated by the eleventh amendment) and municipal government (to which it does ap-
ply in full force). The point of the present critique is the general conception, not the
technical application of the statute, and the complexities of the application will
therefore be assumed. With regard to the complexities, see Levinson, Suing Political
Subdivisions in Federal Court. From Edelman to Owen, 11 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 829
(1980).
51. Compare Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1975),
modified, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1977) with
the dissenting opinion in the en banc decision, 545 F.2d at 576-77.
52. See, e.g., O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (state cannot
confine non-dangerous mentally ill individual, remand for determination of immunity
question).
53. See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1033 (1974); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
54. The good faith immunity cases may be viewed as examples. See, e.g.,
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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the common law. This overlap is most apparent in the case of the
vaguest of the constitutional guarantees, for it is clear that both the
due process clause and state tort law are concerned with the protec-
tion of "life, liberty and property;" but it is descriptive in some
degree of all the guarantees.
If there is truly a distinction between federally protected and
state protected interests, it is a distinction grounded, as a threshold
matter, in the governmental character of the threat to these in-
terests. As a matter of analysis, the distinction is grounded in poten-
tially distinct accommodations of conflicting interests and policies. It
is the threshold matter which presents the difficulty, and that dif-
ficulty requires some extended discussion.
Government and Individual Threats to
Constitutionally Protectable Interests
Although founded upon venerable precedent, the Court's con-
clusion in Monroe that government policy is immaterial to the prob-
lem of the federal regulation of an official's conduct even where that
policy is consistent with federal regulation eliminated constitutional
adjudication's analytical moorings. The justification for federal pro-
tection of private interests-that governmental conduct which
threatens those interests requires regulation 5 -is at least facially
absent in any case in which there exists a constitutionally sufficient
government "remedy" for an individual official's conduct that in-
vades a constitutionally protected interest.' It is therefore facially
absent where the government's prohibition of the individual
official's conduct cannot itself be successfully challenged as constitu-
tionally insufficient. ' The justification for federal protection is, in
55. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Cf. United States v.
Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 77-81 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.) (rights protected against private
conduct versus rights protected against state).
56. Contra, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Home Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). The extreme version of the proposition in the text
is suggested by Barney v. New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904), a case gutted in Home Tel.
and formally interred in United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). See note 79 infra.
57. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (state tort remedies constitute
sufficient "process" to satisfy due process obligation of the state). "Remedy" as used in
the text would therefore include both traditional meanings of the term, such as tort
law, and any government procedure (such as a hearing), rule or policy (such as a pro-
hibition upon use of excessive force by police, or a statute, applicable to officials, pro-
hibiting murder). It would also include any process created to avoid risks of intrusion
into protected interests, such as an identification process. See Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137 (1979), discussed in text at notes 107 to 112 infra.
With respect to the proposition that regulation of government is the extent of
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short, absent where the government makes no express or implicit
claim that the challenged conduct in issue was lawful.
Monroe's rationale for reaching individual conduct was that the
fact of government clothing-the fact that the individual is granted
general authority to act on behalf of government and the in-
struments of government powerS-makes it desirable that the in-
dividual conduct be regulated. Regulation desirable as a matter of
policy is not, however, equivalent to regulation compelled by the
original justification for constitutional regulation. If it is assumed
that the original justification rested in a concern for government
threats to protectable interests, one cannot without obvious diffi-
culty suggest that constitutional regulation is justified in a case in
which the sole threat to constitutionally protectable interests is an
individual official's conduct that contravenes governmental policy.
There is simply no governmental threat to be regulated in such a
case. Nor can such a suggestion be made where the government in
question has provided no remedy but has no constitutional obliga-
tion to do so. There is no governmental threat if there is no govern-
mental obligation.
These propositions obviously contain inherent ambiguities:
what is a "constitutionally sufficient remedy" and when is "govern-
mental protection" against individual threat adequate? The presence
of a governmental remedy only "facially" obviates governmental
threat because mere presence compels neither meaning nor applica-
tion. There remain, in short, the problems of ambiguous government
remedies and of their non-enforcement.
Ambiguous Government Commands
The problem of ambiguous government remedy is the problem
suggested by Snowden v. Hughes 9 It was there claimed that a state
agency's violation of state statute constituted a violation of equal
protection-a claim the Court rejected as a matter of substantive
doctrine. The Court nevertheless accepted the claim's premise: the
conduct of state officials is state action even when it is in violation
of state commands. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, was
the justification or rationale for constitutional guarantees, see Burke & Reber, State
Action, Congressional Power and Creditors Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendment, 46 So. CAL. L. REV. 1003 (1973) (discussing rationale for and values
preserved by state action doctrine).
58. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961).
59. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
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unwilling to accept that premise, and insisted that the action of
state functionaries "cannot be deemed the action of the state ... un-
til the highest court of the State confirms such action and thereby
makes it the law of the State."'
Justice Frankfurter's position is of course not "the law." Nor,
at least in its pristine form, should it be the law. In that form, it im-
plies a too narrow view of the meaning of government threat, for it
seems to require, by means of a constitutional doctrine of exhaus-
tion of state remedies, a federal judicial role limited to review of for-
mal government rules. Government obviously does not act only by
formal rule. It acts through its officials in countless informal ways,
and those actions present threats to protectable interests. It is
equally obvious that informal action can be "authorized" by formal
government command, can be arguably authorized and arguably
unauthorized by formal government command, can occur in practice
even if facially inconsistent with formal government command, and
can occur in practice in the absence of any formal government com-
mand. In all such instances, a claim of government authorization,
and therefore of government prerogative, however facially unwar-
ranted, may be made. To insist upon review only of formal govern-
ment rule is to ignore much, if not most, conduct arguably govern-
mental.
There is nevertheless a kernel of validity to Justice
Frankfurter's position. Because "the state . . .can only act through
functionaries, the question naturally arises what functionaries, act-
ing under what circumstances, are to be deemed the state for pur-
poses of bringing suit . . .on the basis of illegal state action.""1 That
"problem is beset with inherent difficulties ..... ,1 It is, however, a
problem
not to be resolved by abstract considerations such as the
fact that every official who purports to wield power con-
ferred by a state is pro tanto the state. Otherwise every
illegal discrimination by a policeman on the beat would be
state action for purpose of suit in a federal court.'
The kernel of validity here is not that intended by Justice
Frankfurter. It is not that the policeman's discrimination must
60. Id. at 17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 235-39 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
61. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 16 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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necessarily be kept out of federal court. It is, rather, that govern-
ment threat cannot be identified by reference to "abstract con-
siderations." What is required is a judgment, not a formula. The for-
mal institutional action formula suggested by Justice Frankfurter is
inadequate because it ignores too much. The formula he attacks,
although attractive because it eliminates the need for making the
judgment, is equally inadequate both because it generates the
analytical confusion noted earlier and because it generates unlimited
judicial discretion by eliminating the analytical boundaries placed on
that discretion by the necessity of government threat.
The formula Justice Frankfurter attacked is that of defining
"government threat" to include the threat presented by the conduct
of an individual official whether or not the conduct is authorized by
government and whether or not the government in question has
itself a constitutional obligation to prohibit the conduct." Such a
definition of threat imposes a fundamental shift in analysis from
that evident in the review of a formal government rule. The ques-
tion is no longer that of the legitimacy of a government claim of
prerogative; by the definition the presence or absence of such a
claim is immaterial. The question becomes, instead, whether a loss
should be judicially shifted and whether sufficiently blameworthy
conduct is present to warrant federal intervention. This shift re-
quires, in short, inquiry into whether a federal standard of in-
dividual conduct ought to be imposed.
That inquiry requires an analysis at a constitutional level that
necessarily takes a form similar to a tort analysis; the analysis is
framed in terms of negligence, intent, and abuse of authority as mat-
ters of constitutional doctrine. If the fundamental conceptual shift
from the constitutional regulation of government to the constitu-
tional regulation of individual conduct is not recognized and
justified, the analysis would very likely be concerned with pruden-
tial remedial policies -particularly that of a vaguely defined
"federalism" -that are immaterial to the meaning of particular con-
stitutional guarantees."5 Because abandonment of the original
64. See, e.g., cases cited note 60 supra.
65. But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1976) (federalism was not
repealed by the fourteenth amendment and limits the amendment's substantive mean-
ing). With respect to congressional power, compare, National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (tenth amendment as limitation on commerce power) with
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (eleventh amendment not a limitation upon
fourteenth amendment enforcement power) and see note 21 supra.
It is impossible to deny that the motivation for doctrines of federalism is con-
stitutional in origin. There is clearly a notion of distinct government sovereignties
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justification for constitutional regulation permits no basis for
distinguishing cases of an individual official's misconduct from cases
of government misconduct, the analysis would also invoke such
policies in cases in which the obligations of government are at
issue.6
basic to the constitutional scheme. That such a notion limits the substantive meaning
of a constitutional guarantee in any sense other than the standard one of accom-
modating conflicting private and government interests is nevertheless difficult to ac-
cept. The motivation for deciding Paul and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), on
federalism grounds is either respect for and deference to state accommodations of
policy in state remedial processes governing individual conduct, or a conclusion that
such processes are substantively unchallengable. If federalism is a policy merely of
deference to state remedies, it is a federal remedial policy counseling federal hesitation
where an individual's abuse of authority is in issue. If federalism is the label assigned
to substantive constitutional decision, it is of course a policy "material to the meaning
of particular constitutional guarantees," but only in the sense that there has been a
decision that a state's claim of governmental prerogative is upheld. See Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) and note 66 infra. There is of course nothing impermissible
in making a substantive constitutional decision in favor of the state on grounds of
something entitled "federalism" if what is meant is that there is nothing constitutional-
ly illicit in what the state has done or not done. What is wrong with these decisions,
rather, is that it is not clear this is what is meant. What seems to be meant instead is
that the Court believes itself faced with official "torts" better resolved by state than
federal law that it has no principled basis for distinguishing the proper objects of
federal and state concern other than the invocation of a federalism notion it declines to
define precisely. There are two dangers in such a meaning. The first is suggested by
Paul. Although that decision was purportedly based upon narrow "constitutional"
grounds involving the nature of protectable interests, the general principle invoked
was a federalism notion not itself explained. 424 U.S. at 700. Justice Stevens' subse-
quent attempt to rationalize Paul on substantive grounds reflecting federalism values
is satisfactory but clearly suggestive of a distinction between government and in-
dividual official misconduct. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 701-02 (1977) (dissenting
opinion). The second danger is suggested by Rizzo. The Court there invoked both
federalism in the sense of remedial hesitation and, at least in passing, absence of "con-
stitutional duty" in some substantive sense-a combination suggesting a blurring of at
least theoretical lines between substantive and remedial policy. 423 U.S. at 376-77. It
would of course be possible for the Court to conclude that a state's structure of
remedial rules is substantively inadequate but to refrain from invoking a particular
remedy on grounds, e.g., of federalism. What seems objectionable is a decision on the
substantive issue influenced by remedial considerations. See note 66 infra.
66. An example is Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The fact of constitu-
tional violations was there assumed. The question was that of the propriety of
equitable relief against supervisory officials for failures of supervision. Among the
many reasons for rejection of such relief in Rizzo (including "federalism") was that the
individual officials had no "constitutional duty" to supervise. Id. at 376-77. Of course
they had no such duty. If the present discussion is accepted as premise, only govern-
ments have "constitutional duties." Assuming constitutional violations occurred in fact,
however, the problem before the court was one of remedial policy, not constitutional
duty. It is clear that a supervisor's negligent supervision has or can have a factual con-
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nection to a constitutional deprivation. The question was therefore that of the super-
visory officials' statutory duty under Section 1983.
It is apparent that both the compensation policy of the statute, by virtue of
more and deeper pockets, and the deterrence policy of the statute, by virtue of an
assumption that supervisors subjected to potential liability for inadequate supervision
would take steps to correct the misconduct of subordinates, would be served by liabil-
ity for negligent supervision. Whether such liability is a real possibility is of course
dependent upon one's interpretation of both Rizzo and of Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978). See, e.g., Levinson, supra note
506, at 841-46; Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213,
235-37 (1979).
Professor Nahmod suggests, I think quite properly, that Monell's emphasis
upon cause in fact (and upon the "cause" language of the statute) is properly inter-
preted as a reference to the question of duty. S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 178-79. The
problem is not one of cause-it is apparent that there is nearly always a factual con-
nection (stated in terms of failure to train or otherwise) between the conduct of local
governments or supervisory personnel and the misconduct of the immediate govern-
ment actor. Cf. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (factual connection between
conduct of government and non-government actors). The question is whether the
supervisor had a duty to act. But Nahmod initially terms the question one of "constitu-
tional duty": "the rejection in Monell of respondeat superior indicates that there is no
constitutional duty running from the local government to the deprived plaintiff," S.
NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 179. He follows that statement with the confusing statement
that official policy or custom "is a condition precedent to the imposition of a constitu-
tional or 1983 duty upon a local government." Id. (emphasis supplied). It seems clear,
however, that the "failure to act" duty issue suggested by Monell has, by the terms of
that opinion, nothing to do with constitutional deprivation. Monell is a case pervasively
and narrowly concerned with statutory interpretation. To the extent footnote 58 in the
Monell opinion, 436 U.S. at 694, modifies Rizzo, it suggests a statutory understanding
of Rizzo, Rizzo's constitutional duty language to the contrary notwithstanding.
Despite the fact that Monell was concerned with a question of statutory rather
than constitutional "duty," it is possible to legitimately frame the issue suggested by
footnote 58 in Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, and by Rizzo, as one of constitutional obligation
requiring a constitutional analysis. In constitutional terms, the question is one of
governmental obligation to create a procedure or remedy by which supervision will oc-
cur, perhaps as a matter of due process and perhaps as a matter of the more specific
constitutional provisions "violated" in Rizzo. It is difficult to believe, for example, that
a government could, as a matter of constitutional law, issue guns to its policemen in
the absence of any rule regarding the use of such weapons. A government which
therefore in effect authorized the "murder" of criminal suspects would presumably be
engaged in the deprivation of life without due process of law. See Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 211 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
28 (1949)).
What this article suggests about Monell is that the Court has the problem in
some measure backwards. It seems concerned with finding a statutory obligation on
the part of government to not generate policy which "causes" constitutional depriva-
tions by individual officials. If the present analysis is accepted, the proper concern
would be that of the government's constitutional "remedial" obligation in the broad
sense of the term remedy-i.e., is the government's policy itself unconstitutional either
because it affirmatively authorizes invasions of protected interests for insufficient
reasons or because it fails to prohibit such invasions? If unconstitutional, the govern-
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Personalization of government threat, in addition to generating
the noted confusion, eliminates analytical limits upon judicial discre-
tion. That is true not only in the limited "federalism" sense with
which Mr. Justice Frankfurter was concerned-his insistence upon
review only of formal state rules clearly limits occasions for the ex-
ercise of federal judicial authority-but also in the broader sense
that distinct analytical inquiries impose distinct limits upon the ex-
ercise of discretion. Inquiry only into the constitutional validity of a
government claim of prerogative confines discretion by rendering
additional inquiries-those suggested by the tort analogy-im-
material.
It is true that the argument for limiting judicial discretion ap-
pears to have less force in the case of federal regulation of an of-
ficial's abuse of authority than in the case of federal judicial review
of legislation." It is not likely that the democratic values underlying
judicial deference to legislative decision will be threatened by liabil-
ity for such an abuse of authority. It may therefore be argued that
unconfined judicial discretion is not a sufficient reason for more nar-
rowly defining government threat: To the extent that an official's
conduct reflects legislative decision, judicial discretion is limited not
only by a narrow inquiry into the validity of that decision but also
by a presumed deference to representative decision making pro-
cesses. To the extent an official's conduct contravenes legislative
choice, a major basis for limiting judicial discretion is absent.
There is surface plausibility to this argument, but it ignores
the fact that deference to legislative decision is desirable at the
federal as well as the state level of government. If one accepts the
proposition that Congress should have a substantial role to play in
ment's liability would presumably be strict. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 662 (1980). Of course, if one assumes a facially constitutional government policy,
the conduct of individual agents of the government, in e.g., engaging in "unconstitu-
tional" searches is not thereby necessarily rendered "constitutional." The question in
such a case is whether the conduct of the agent may be deemed governmental in the
sense that it is the object of constitutional regulation. The facially constitutional policy
might, for example, be unenforced. Or, if the government is not constitutionally re-
quired to "supervise," in the sense at least of a constitutional requirement imposing a
particular remedial structure on a police department, the conduct of particular
policemen might nevertheless be characterized as governmental -the absence of a
remedial structure being a datum in that determination. If the searches were "un-
constitutional," the question of who pays, as Monell and Owen make clear, is a
statutory issue. If the searches were "constitutional," in the sense that an adequate
government remedial structure obviated any claim of government authorization, the
question of liability would be a statutory issue. See text at notes 98-114, infra.
67. See generally, ELY, supra note 44.
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determining the nature and scope of the federal regulation of the
states'-a proposition at least implicit in the assumption that it is a
congressionally created cause of action with which we are presently
concerned -preservation of a congressional forum for accom-
modating state and individual interests is itself a positive value. A
constitutional definition of government threat that includes in-
dividual misuse of power limits the potential extent of Congress's
role and impairs the value.
In rejecting both Justice Frankfurter's "formula" and its alter-
native-that individual misuse of power constitutes government
threat-this discussion has seemed to suggest its own formula: a
government claim of prerogative is necessary to a government
threat. Such a claim triggers a "constitutional analysis," not a "tort
analysis," for it invites consideration of government interests, not
individual misbehavior. A government threat is implied by a govern-
ment claim of prerogative, because it suggests that an official's con-
duct is consistent with government decision or policy. A claim of
prerogative also defines the government threat in the sense that it
defines the proper object of constitutional regulation. However, the
fact that an official makes such a claim of government prerogative
does not necessarily mean that a government threat is present. As
will be pointed out in the next section, it may be desirable, as a mat-
ter of judicial administration, to utilize a claim of prerogative as a
proxy for distinguishing government and individual threat, but it
does not follow from the claim that the party making it is the
government. Nor is it true that the absence of a formal claim
necessary means that analysis of an implicit claim is precluded. The
essential question is not who makes the claim, the formality of the
claim, or the clarity of the claim. The essential question is whether
there is a claim.
Enforced and Unenforced Government Commands:
The Fourth Amendment As Illustration
The preceding section makes three fundamental points: con-
stitutional regulation is concerned with the regulation of govern-
ment threats to protectable interests; an individual official's threat
to protectable interests is not a government threat to those in-
terests where the government itself provides constitutionally suffi-
cient protection against the threat (or where it is not constitutionally
68. See authorities cited notes 87-90 infra. Cf. Choper supra note 21 (arguing
that Congress has plenary power in this context).
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required to do so) because the government makes no claim to
legitimacy in such a case; and, despite the inherent difficulty
generated by the ambiguity of government "remedies" for individual
misconduct, ignoring the distinction between a government and an
individual generates confused and insufficiently limited judicial
analysis at a constitutional level. The present section seeks to sug-
gest both that the enforcement of government command is not itself
an adequate formula for making the needed distinction and that a
resort to purported distinctions between types of substantive con-
stitutional commands ignores the distinction.
It is apparent that some constitutional provisions appear to
contemplate direct regulation at a constitutional level of individual
conduct. The clearest example is the fourth amendment, for it is an
individual official who "searches" and "seizes." The official must
therefore have probable cause and either a warrant or "exigent cir-
cumstances." It is, however, not the case that the constitutional
analysis employed is therefore concerned with regulation of in-
dividual conduct. The concern remains that of government. The
analysis consists of a balancing of the privacy and personal security
interests protected by the amendment against the abstract and
generalized interests of law enforcement or of government. It does
not, for example, matter that the individual official's intent or
motive was illicit, for the search he conducts may nevertheless be
constitutional. 9 His intent, motive or other "state of mind" is a mat-
ter material to remedy, not constitutionality. It is quite true that
individual conduct is regulated under the fourth amendment in the
sense that it is a government official who is told by a court ad-
judicating a fourth amendment claim what is and is not permissible
under the amendment, but the official is told in his representative
capacity. His claim that it was his prerogative to conduct a search
under specified circumstances is in fact a claim that it was the
government's prerogative to do so.
The clear purpose of the fourth amendment is to identify when
an intrusion into generally protected private interests is warranted
and, perhaps, the scope of the warranted intrusion. The purpose is
not to regulate the particular policeman's idiosyncratic conduct in ef-
69. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1978).
70. Id. at 139 n.13. But cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting the fourth amendment may be an peculiarly appropriate basis for an implied
cause of action against federal officials in view of its regulation of individual conduct).
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fecting an otherwise constitutional search or seizure.7 A case such
as Jenkins v. Averett7 -in which the court found a fourth amend-
ment violation in an arresting officer's use of excessive force
because the arresting officer's conduct constituted "gross
negligence" amounting to "intent""3-is therefore not properly
classified as a case involving direct constitutional protection of
private interests. If the fourth amendment as such regulates means
of effecting a search or seizure, it properly does so directly only in
the case of a government policy authorizing or commanding a means
repugnant to the amendment, not in the case of individual "frolic
and detour."
The assertion that "frolic and detour" is not the concern of the
amendment leaves the problem, again, of determining when it is
"frolic and detour" and not government conduct which is at issue.
The fourth amendment remains the illustration. In the typical fourth
amendment case in the criminal context, the government claims a
search was lawful. The police officer's conduct in effecting the
search is therefore clearly analyzed as government conduct: the
government, even where that government has promulgated a pro-
hibition against searches conducted in violation of the fourth amend-
ment, clearly threatens a constitutionally protected interest."
71. But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) (scope of intrusion);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (means of intrusion). It has been
argued with considerable force that one purpose of the fourth amendment is to
preclude arbitrary police conduct by limiting the discretion of the policeman in the
field. W. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 15-18 (Supp. 1981); Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 415-16 (1974). See Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). A scheme of government rules regulating in-
dividual police conduct might under some circumstances, and particularly where the
rules are followed, preclude a finding of a fourth amendment violation. See South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). I am not, however, contending that a govern-
ment, by granting greater discretion, generates less risk of a constitutional violation.
My contention is quite the opposite, for the degree of discretion granted is significant-
ly material to the question whether the policeman's conduct is properly characterized
as the government's conduct. Indeed, treating the individual officer's conduct as the
primary focus of attention may generate an incentive for the government to abdicate
its responsibility for regulating that conduct. See note 66 supra; LAFAVE, supra at
172 (1978). But see Id. at 15 (1981 Supp.).
72. 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
73. Id. at 1232. See S. NAHMOD, supra note 3, at 67.
74. The government is a threat because it claims the search was legitimate
and has therefore presumably "authorized" the search. The exclusionary rule in effect
operates to require such a claim. It is of course clear that the government could make
no such claim and could even prohibit the search and nevertheless attempt to use the
evidence obtained in the search. In making such an attempt, the government would,
however, be attacking the remedy, not asserting a claim to the legitimacy of the
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Let us suppose, however, an atypical case. The policeman con-
ducts a clearly unauthorized government-prohibited search (e.g.,
without warrant, without probable cause, without exigent cir-
cumstance) and is disciplined by the government for so doing. The
government in this atypical case does not appear to constitute a
threat to a protected (privacy) interest; the basic justification for
constitutional regulation-the regulation of government threats to
protected interests-is not present.
If the government does not, in the hypothetical atypical case,
present a threat to a protectable interest, has there been a "viola-
tion" of the fourth amendment? The question may be made more dif-
ficult by varying the hypothetical. Suppose the government does not
enforce its prohibition, or that it enforces the prohibition in general
but not in the particular case. Does the government remain a threat
within the meaning of the original justification for constitutional
regulation? If the government enforces its prohibition only in the
case of intentional violations, may a concept of constitutional law
which requires the presence of a government threat incorporate the
government's enforcement standard and therefore adopt intent as a
constitutional standard through the "back door" of an "adequate"
government remedy?
The answers to these questions require a return to some basic
principles. The reason for inquiry into the presence or absence of a
government remedy is not to measure state remedies against a con-
stitutional standard the concern of which is adequacy. The reason,
rather, is to identify the character of the threat to protected in-
terests. Adequacy may be viewed as the direct concern of due pro-
cess,"5 but a provision such as the fourth amendment is not facially
concerned with whether the government has or has not created a
structure of rules consistent with the provision's commands. It is
concerned, rather, with whether the government did or did not com-
ply in fact with those commands.
In another sense, however, the inquiry into the presence or
absence of a government remedy does measure adequacy. This in-
quiry measures adequacy because it assumes that the proper func-
tion of constitutional regulation is the regulation of government
claims that government conduct is legitimate. Such a claim may be
search. The intimate connection between the exclusionary rule "remedy" and the con-
stitutional prohibition is nevertheless obvious. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 224 (1973).
75. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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reflected in a formal rule, and the presence of a government claim is
most obvious in such a case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's position to
the contrary notwithstanding, such a claim may also be reflected in-
formally in the conduct of government officials. It is therefore clear
that one means of determining whether there is an absence of
government threat is determining whether an individual official is
prohibited by government rule from engaging in the conduct which
is the subject of claimed constitutional regulation.
It is less clear whether an identified government rule must be
enforced to obviate government threat. It may with justification be
argued that an unenforced rule is no rule; that what is crucial is
government custom, not government rhetoric 6 But if there is a
generally enforced government rule, there is no clear government
claim of prerogative in any specific instance where enforcement
does not occur in fact." What is required, again, is judgment rather
76. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Robinson v. Florida, 378
U.S. 153 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1963).
77. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court declined to impose an
exhaustion of state remedies requirement because "(tihe federal remedy is supplemen-
tary to the state remedy." 365 U.S. at 183 (emphasis supplied). Justice Frankfurter, in
dissent, argued that the "under color" language of Section 1983 refers to state
authorized misconduct in somewhat the same sense that the text here uses the phrase
"generally enforced" government rule. 365 U.S. at 235-37. Justice Frankfurter at one
point suggested that application of a state's good faith immunity defense would con-
stitute sufficient "authorization" to warrant the conclusion that the state (by the pre-
sent terminology, the "government") was involved ("presented a threat to protectable
interests"). At another point he refers to his conception of fourteenth amendment due
process (that is, to the conception central to his position in the "incorporation" debate),
and might therefore have insisted upon something more indicative of government
authorization than a mere defense conferred upon police officers as a part of the
government's enforcement scheme. 365 U.S. at 237-38. Justice Frankfurter recognized
the possibility of an "extension" through congressional enactment, 365 U.S. at 211-12,
238-39, but was unwilling to interpret Section 1983 as such an extension.
It seems proper to conclude, within the framework of the conception advocated
here, that the presence of state law defenses to state prohibitions would not ipso facto
render a policeman's conduct authorized by the state. It is simply not true that the
absence of a remedy in fact in the particular case necessarily means that the state has
not fulfilled its constitutional obligations: a government's decision not to punish, at
least if made for reasons distinct from any attempt to avoid constitutional restrictions
upon government conduct, does not render an official's misconduct "authorized." Cf.
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (government
decision based in part upon constitutionally impermissible considerations not
remediable-at least in the sense of reinstatement-if permissible considerations
would have "caused" the decision). Despite the remedial context, Mt. Healthy may be
viewed in adequacy terms as suggesting that, although consideration of constitution-
ally improper matter constitutes a "government threat" to protectable interests, the
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than formula. One datum for the judgment is the presence or
absence of a rule, and another undoubtedly is the presence and
degree of enforcement. A third is the clarity and specificity of the
rule. The proper test of government threat is less important than
the point that the presence of government threat to protected in-
terests in the form of a government claim of prerogative must be
identified if the appropriate analysis is to be identified.
It may legitimately be objected that the difficulty inherent in
separating government threat from individual threat impeaches the
distinction. Such an objection is, however, an objection grounded
upon administration of the statute, not the invalidity of the distinc-
tion as a concept. It is an objection viable in the grey area and may
justify, within the grey area, a more-or-less arbitrary classification.
The difficulty of the separation is illustrated by the
hypothetical case, suggested above, of an enforced government pro-
hibition of a search. Assume that the policeman is sued in a Section
1983 action. He might argue by way of defense that the search was
in fact "constitutional" despite the absence of state authorization.
This is a viable argument. The fact that the search was not author-
ized by the state does not decide the question whether the govern-
ment could, consistently with a constitutional standard, authorize
that search. The proposition that the justification for constitutional
regulation is absent where there is no government threat to a pro-
tected interest is not a statement that state law controls federal
questions."8 Nor is it necessarily a statement that an individual of-
ficial lacks standing to assert government interests where govern-
ment has struck a balance which limits those interests in a manner
resulting decision, if it would have been made for licit reasons in any event, does not
constitute a government threat. Of course the government's remedial "rule" may also
be viewed as a source of authorization and the proper subject of constitutional
analysis. See, e.g., Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975).
78. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390-94 (1971); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975).
See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Glennon, supra note 4 (suggesting
the "borrowing" of state law).
It is of course apparent that, if the argument made here is at least for the mo-
ment accepted, the "government threat" notion is intimately bound up with state law
as well as state custom and policy. If enforcement of state prohibitions in specific cases
is thought unnecessary to warrant a finding that no government threat exists, note 77
supra, the state's good faith defense becomes, in a very limited sense, a factor controll-
ing the application of the federal standard. It is, however, not controlling in the sense
in which Justice Frankfurter's Monroe dissent might make it controlling, note 77
supra. Under the present conception, there exists the second category of cases. See
text accompanying notes 88-96 infra.
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potentially more restrictive than a constitutional standard would
permit. It is, rather, a statement that the object of constitutional
regulation is government and that one cannot invoke a constitu-
tional guarantee absent an assumption-at least hypothetical if not
real-that government presents the threat to interests protec table
under the guarantee.
There are of course very real objections to permitting the of-
ficer to make this argument-it seeks, for example, an advisory
opinion-but, if we assume that permission is granted, the analysis
employed is a constitutional analysis: the officer frames the argu-
ment in terms of exigency and probable cause, not "state of mind."
If it is concluded that there was a fourth amendment violation, the
conclusion is in fact that there was a hypothetical fourth amendment
violation: if the officer's search had been authorized, there would
have been a fourth amendment violation. What we have in the
hypothetical case is an abuse of individual power and authority and
nothing more than that. There is, under the limited and unlikely con-
ditions of the hypothetical, no government claim of prerogative. If
the policeman were permitted to make the argument, it is for policy
reasons independent of the character of the threat presented to pro-
tected interests by the policeman's conduct. Whether there is or is
not a government claim of prerogative in a given case is, in practice,
likely to be muddled, and it therefore may be desirable to treat the
official's claim as a government claim. But such a treatment, albeit
justified on grounds of administration, remains treatment of a
government, not an individual claim of legitimacy of conduct.
These assertions raise the question why it might be thought
necessary to regulate by constitutional law a wholly individual
threat to protectable interests. The question is suggested by the se-
cond argument the policeman in the atypical case might make. The
second argument is that there was no fourth amendment violation
because the government did not authorize his conduct." As the
government presents no threat to a protected interest, the justifica-
tion for constitutional regulation is absent. We are now at the heart
of the objection to basing the analysis on government claims of
79.See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 288 (1913). It is in-
teresting that the Court relied, in Home Tel., principally upon Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), a case founded upon fiction. It should nevertheless be clear that Home
Tel. would not necessarily be decided differently, even at a constitutional level of
analysis, under the conception proposed here. It is only Justice Frankfurter's in-
sistence upon formal state rules as the measure of state action that would compel a dif-
ferent result. See Barney v. New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904).
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prerogative, for it can forcefully be argued that the analysis lets the
constable off the federal hook by too narrowly defining the object of
constitutional regulation.
We may presume that letting the constable off is an
undesirable, as distinguished from unconstitutional, result. It has
never been wholly clear why it is an undesirable result, but at least
two possibilities suggest themselves. If one assumes that the ap-
propriate test of government threat is the absence of any generally
enforced government rule prohibiting official misconduct (so that
there is no government threat if neither the government's ex-
pressed position nor its custom or practice presents a threat), there
remains the individual case in which the rule is not enforced.
Though such a case may not involve a government threat in a con-
stitutional sense (for the reason, e.g., that a government-generated
defense to the usual enforcement of the prohibition, such as good
faith, may be thought to present no threat) one might nevertheless
claim that there is a legitimate federal interest in appearances-in
the presumed perception of the citizenry that a policeman, however
unauthorized his conduct, is a policeman. One might claim,
moreover, that the difficulty inherent in distinguishing government
from individual threat in such a case generates a risk of error in
classification sufficient to warrant prophylaxis: one may wish to
regulate individuals as a means of deterring governments.8' The dif-
ficulty inherent in discovering government claims of prerogative,
which arises once it is recognized that such a claim may be made by
means other than formal rule, may justify some more or less ar-
bitrary classification. One such classification is suggested by the
potential line between general enforcement of government rules and
specific enforcement of government rules. The classification carries
with it, given the difficulty of the underlying inquiry, risk of error.
Assuming, then, the desirability of federal regulation of in-
dividual threat, there are three possible solutions. First, one may
disregard the notion that the original concern of constitutional
80. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 238 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
81. The argument may also justify arbitrary classification in cases such as
that suggested by the policeman seeking to invoke government interests where
government has prohibited his conduct, but it would not justify ignoring the need for a
classification as a starting point of analysis. One must come to some initial conclusion
about whether government or individual threat is the object of regulation, or the
dangers of confusion discussed in the text arise. More important, the classification per-
mits further consideration and direct analysis of the reasons for extension of constitu-
tional values to individual conduct without the intrusion of constitutional rhetoric.
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guarantees was limited to government threats to protected in-
terests. The difficulties with this solution are those suggested
earlier: confused analysis, the removal of shackles on judicial discre-
tion and, therefore, a denial of the values underlying the notion that
the Constitution regulates only government. 2
Second, one may make an exception to the original concern no-
tion in fourth amendment cases and, probably, in the case of any
other guarantee one wishes to conceive as subject to violation by in-
dividual officials. The second alternative would, in effect, treat the
justification for constitutional regulation as dependent upon the
guarantee, or the factual situation, in issue. Such treatment would
be somewhat similar to Professor Tribe's notion that the meaning of
"state action" is intimately a matter of the constitutional guarantee
and its application, and should therefore be treated substantively as
varying with context."3 Under this notion, constitutional provisions
regulating government rules and those regulating government ac-
tors are to be distinguished." Although I do not agree with this
distinction, the similarity of the assertion made here that govern-
ment claims of prerogative are regulated by constitutional law and
Professor Tribe's argument that structures of government rules are
regulated by at least some aspects of constitutional law is patent.
My disagreement is with Professor Tribe's attempt to solve the
dilemma by invoking actor-regulating provisions-a notion inconsis-
tent with my major premise.
There are three difficulties with this solution. First, it is not
clear which constitutional provisions fall within which category. As
noted here, the fourth amendment is best viewed as concerned with
government rules or claims of prerogative, not actors as such. At-
tempts at finding textual bases for actor regulation have not been
persuasive,85 and it is difficult to see any textual basis for such a
82. See notes 64-68 supra and accompanying text. The same disadvantage
may be said to infect the third alternative suggested here, text infra at notes 88-96,
but the third alternative is grounded upon legislation (or, at least, upon the possibility
of congressional veto). It is therefore not a threat to at least one major value underly-
ing "state action" doctrine: the doctrine's limitation upon the institution of (non-
democratic) judicial review.
83. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147-74 (1978).
84. Id. See also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 176-77 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Glennon & Novak, A Functional Analysis of the "State Ac-
tion Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 221, 230-31.
85. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 13 at 64 (suggesting "reasonableness" require-
ment of fourth amendment is basis for negligence liability). Professor Kirkpatrick
himself recognizes the difficulties with the proposition. Id. at 64 n.110. See also in this
connection, Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1978).
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finding in any constitutional provision. Second, the solution suffers
from at least one of the same difficulties as the first. It authorizes,
by an exercise of judicial discretion in the categorizing of rule-
regulating and actor-regulating provisions, unbounded judicial
discretion in regulating individual conduct not reflective of govern-
ment threat. Third, by asserting that at least some constitutional
provisions are prima facie actor-regulating, the solution renders un-
necessary the inquiry into reasons for regulating individual threats
to protected interests. That inquiry, however, is crucial if the Court
is to be confined in its decision making by the underlying and
limiting value at the core of state action theory: that it is govern-
ment which defines the legitimate object of the courts' regulatory
function. 6
The third alternative solution by which the federal regulation
of individual threat can be justified is to relegate these cases to a
category independent of the government threat category-to a
category of cases in which the original concern is modified by
statute so as to subject the conduct of individuals to federal regula-
tion. The advantages of the third alternative are two. First, it per-
mits principled justification for decision making on the basis of the
identification and explication of the reasons for the federal regula-
tion of individual conduct. Second, it permits Congress, as the
source of the third alternative, to regulate or to not regulate in-
dividual conduct and to formulate and accommodate federal policies
appropriate to those regulatory decisions.87
86. The point here is to suggest that the object of the self-executing aspects
of constitutional law is properly confined to regulation of government conduct in-
cluding - as The Civil Rights Cases suggest - government authorization of private con-
duct through non-regulation. 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883). The grounds for such a confined role
may, it is true, be found in part in the preservation of liberty. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1149-57 (1978). But they may at least equally be found in the con-
stitutional values underlying the organization of government, id. at 1149-50, and most
particularly in the limited role properly assigned the judiciary in a democracy.
87. I recognize that reference to Congress may not be thought an advantage
by some. It is at least fairly clear that Congress possesses the power to expand or con-
tract the federal cause of action and would possess that power even if the Court
sought to imply a cause of action directly. See note 118 infra and accompanying text.
It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to examine the premis that a greater
congressional role in exercising that authority is preferable to the ad hoc approach
adopted by the courts, but at least three reasons may be summarily suggested: (1) the
inherent advantages of Congress as a fact finder in formulating appropriate federal
policy; see generally A. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determination, 40
U. CIN. L. REV. 199 (1971); (2) congressional superiority as an institution representing
state interests and, therefore, the institutional appropriateness of Congress in acccom-
modating federalism, see generally Burt, Miranda and Title H. A Morganatic Mar-
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Section 1983 As Congressional Amendment of
Original Constitutional Concern
The means by which the third alternative may be implemented
is to invoke the authority of the Congress to amend the original con-
stitutional concern. The source of congressional authority is clear:
the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment. It is of course
possible to challenge the scope of that authority," but the premise
of this discussion is that it legitimately exists.8" Upon that assump-
tion, the rationale is equally clear: Congress may view constitutional
guarantees as norms that may be remedially extended" to encom-
pass individual conduct, particularly where Congress distrusts the
effectiveness, as distinguished from the existence, of state remedial
structures.
The statutory means of reaching individual conduct necessarily
implies a statutory mode of analysis, for the statutory means,
although an extension of constitutional norm in the sense of general
principle, leaves the original concern of federal regulation-the
regulation of government -intact. It therefore leaves the original
constitutional mode of analysis intact. The constitutional mode will
not, however, give answers to questions it was not designed to
answer. The statutory means therefore requires both statutory
questions and statutory answers-even answers supplied in-
terstitially by common law making. Such questions and answers
relate to individual liability and therefore quite properly resemble
tort questions and tort answers. Negligence, intent, and similar con-
structs are, under this statutory view of the cause of action,
riage, 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 81; Choper, supra note 21; and (3) the absence of a structure
of clearly defined federal interests which has made judicial decision in this area largely
rudderless and which Congress might resolve by providing direction, see generally
Shapo, supra note 4.
88. See, generally, Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and
Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975).
89. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, _ U.S. . 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970). See generally Burt, supra note 87; A. Cox, Foreword" Constitutional Adjudica-
tion and the Protection of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966); Gordon, The
Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment To Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 656
(1977).
90. See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). On the question of congressional authority
to intrude upon federalism, see generally Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 152-56
(1978); Choper, supra note 21; Monaghan, supra note 42, at 26-38.
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statutory constructs. An individual government official's duty, under
the statutory means, is a statutory duty.
It is obvious that the statutory means referred to here is Sec-
tion 1983-more properly, one aspect of Section 1983. The underly-
ing assumption is that "state action" and action "under color" of
state law are not equivalent notions.9 The obvious argument against
the proposition that Section 1983 statutorily extends the original
justification for constitutional regulation is that Congress intended
no such result. That argument was, however, answered in Monroe v.
Pape. The Court in Monroe invoked "intent" as a matter of
statutory interpretation and extended federal regulation to abuse of
individual authority and power on the basis of an extended discus-
sion of the congressional purpose underlying Section 1983. The con-
clusions reached in Monroe, despite the ambiguity of the congres-
sional purpose,92 were not unwarranted conclusions. Congress sought
to reach Ku Klux Klan outrages in the South and was concerned
with official inaction-the ineffectivenes as distinguished from the
existence of state remedies.93 Such an objective is not inconsistent
with the rationale suggested here for a statutory means of enforcing
constitutional norms by modifying the original concern.
It should be apparent that viewing Section 1983 as statutorily
extending constitutional norms does not itself resolve the difficulty
of identifying government threat, nor does it obviate the need for
identification. It merely provides the basis for seeking to classify
cases as involving or not involving government threats. Classifica-
tion identifies the appropriate judicial analysis, not outcomes of
cases. Nor does the statutory means automatically resolve the ques-
tion of when the regulation of individual threat is warranted. It
91. But see, e.g., Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). The distinction
is suggested by the distinctions made in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in
Adickes. Id. at 188-234. See id at 211 ("state action" not equivalent to "under color" of
state law); id. at 221-22 (distinguishing categories or types of interference with con-
stitutional rights); id. at 224 (suggesting broad meaning of the term "deprivation" in
the statute); id. at 231-34 (discussing state of mind as matter of statutory law). As my
view of the scope and meaning of a "constitutional right"-at least in the self-effecting
sense-appears much narrower than that envisioned by Justice Brennan in the
Adickes dissent, I do not claim the dissent as direct authority here. In this connec-
tion, see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 717 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 779 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring) (interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 241).
92. See, generally Shapo, supra note 4.
93. Id See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). But see Note, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1486 (1969).
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merely requires consideration of congressional purpose and
generates the necessity for the articulation of reasons for such
regulation.
The obvious objection to this argument is that Section 1983
does not itself create rights but merely serves as the authority for a
lawsuit to enforce rights created elsewhere-in the Constitution or
in other federal legislation.94 It may therefore be claimed that
abuses of power would not be actionable under the proposed inter-
pretation because the rights created by the Constitution are rights
only against claims of government.
The objection has merit, but only if its understanding of the
term "rights" is accepted. To define the rights enforceable by the
statute as limited to the right to be free from conduct prohibited by
laws distinct from the statute would impair the theory advocated
here, but it would also impair presently controlling conceptions of
the Section 1983 cause of action. The Section 1983 defenses help to
define the conduct against which the statute provides protection.
Although there is a rather barren formal distinction between the
absence of a deprivation of right and a successfully asserted affirm-
ative defense, the right enforced by the statute in the functional
sense is a right merely to be free from conduct not undertaken in
good faith. The same difficulty would confront Monroe v. Pape: if
only intentional fourth amendment violations are, as a matter of the
statute, actionable, the intent requirement is a functional component
of the meaning of the "right" enforced by the statute.
The statute, then, is not accurately characterized, even under
the current understanding of its function, as a mere vehicle for the
enforcement of rights, the meaning of which it does not affect. It is,
however, true that the position advocated here-that the statute
should be interpreted to create rights against individual abuse of
authority on the premise that the Constitution does not do so-does
not necessarily follow from that observation. There is a distinction
between a statutory implementation of a presumed external right
and a statutory creation of new rights. Nevertheless, the
significance of that distinction may be questioned by noting that in-
terstitial federal common law may be generated by a statutory
grant of adjudicatory authority necessary to the effective enforce-
94. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 617
(1979). See generally Maine v. Thiboutot, - U.S. __, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980); Lynch
v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
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ment of federal (constitutional) policy." The interests preserved by
constitutional policy are at least relatively identifiable. As noted
earlier, there are at least two justifications for protecting those in-
terests by extending federal regulation to individual conduct:
preserving expectations of order and rationality in the conduct of
government officials and the potential need for regulating in-
dividuals as a means of deterring governments. It is not alien to ac-
cepted notions of proper judicial function to suppose that the courts
may permissibly formulate a body of federal law designed to
preserve identifiable constitutional interests from threats distinct
from but related to those with which the Constitution itself is con-
cerned."
THE SUGGESTED CONCEPTION
It is now possible to propose an alternative conception of the
cause of action created by Section 1983." The basis for the concep-
tion is the distinction discussed above between at least two aspects
of the statute and, therefore, two categories of cases. What follows
is a description of these categories with brief suggestions concern-
ing how some recent cases illustrate the analysis in each.
Individual Defendant as Representative of Government:
The Government As Object of Regulation
One category of cases involves direct challenges to government
policy, rule, or inaction. The analysis is directly constitutional and
the problem it addresses is the accommodation of conflicting private
and governmental interests. The analysis assumes a government
95. Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (jurisdic-
tional grant generating "federal common law"); Monaghan, supra note 42 (purportedly
constitutional doctrines as subconstitutional doctrines "overruleable" by Congress).
96. Cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 778-80 (1966) (Brennan, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (meaning of "right secured by the Constitution" in 18 U.S.C. §
241).
97. It is not pretended that the conception is new. It is suggested by Monroe
and is at least implicit in much of the commentary. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 4;
Glennon, supra note 4. See also Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of
Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486 (1969) (suggesting adequacy analysis at
statutory level); Note, Civil Rights and State Authority: Toward The Production of a
Just Equilibrium, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 831. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 42 (regarding
Bivens, remedy) But see Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 1352 (1970). It is equally not pretended, however, that these authorities support
the extent to which I take the underlying notion of a distinction between government
and government official misconduct. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 42, at 24 n.125.
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claim of prerogative as its proper subject matter. State of mind
plays no role here unless state of mind is pertinent to the underly-
ing constitutional conception-for example, the equal protection doc-
trine to the extent that doctrine is concerned with basis for
decision."
The role played by the individual in such a case is immaterial
to the analysis at this constitutional level. Rather, the constitutional
analysis is concerned with government as an abstraction distinct
from the individuals who act in its behalf. The category is therefore
best illustrated by cases in which the relief sought is equitable
because that remedy is more clearly designed to afford broad relief
from government policy. The category is not, however, limited to
such cases. The deterrent function served by liability for
damages- particularly where government entities are liable-may
be viewed as affording similar relief. The statute is a legal vehicle
for the lawsuit, but it can play an independent role in the sense that
issues of personal liability should be subjected to a statutory or com-
mon law analysis once a decision has been reached on the constitu-
tional issue. Therefore, it is, for example, possible that an injunction
will be appropriate but that damages will not."
It is possible to view a case such as Ingraham v. Wright1" as
falling within this category. The Court there concluded that,
although school children have an interest in personal security pro-
tected by the due process clause, state tort remedies for the abuse
of a teacher's common law privilege to impose corporal punishment
on students are sufficient to satisfy "due process of law." Although
one suspects that this formulation was in part motivated again by
the Court's fear of a "general federal tort law," it does suggest an
analysis concerned with the federal regulation of governments.
Professor Tribe has interpreted Ingraham as indicating that
some constitutional guarantees -particularly due process and just
compensation-cannot be violated by an individual acting in isola-
tion; more "systematic government activity" is required. 0 ' Although
that view has substantial merit, it should suggest an additional cor-
ollary: Where there has been "systematic government activity" suf-
ficient to violate, for example, due process (where government as
98. See note 44 supra.
99. The implication, of course, is that the affirmative "good faith" defenses
are statements of statutory duty. See note 40, supra.
100. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
101. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1162 (1978). See note 50 supra.
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abstraction has "violated" the constitution), the conclusion that no
individual official's conduct constituted the violation should not be
grounds for an additional conclusion that individuals cannot
therefore be statutorily liable in damages.
The validity of the analysis employed in Ingraham-and
employable in recasting Paul v. Davis as holding only that state
defamation remedies satisfy due process02 -is its recognition that a
government's systematic response to due process concerns is what
determines whether any constitutional deprivation occurred. The
question of liability, if it is determined that the systematic response
is constitutionally inadequate, is a separate issue. If Ingraham sug-
gests that isolated individual conduct cannot violate procedural due
process, it is in the sense that the meaning of constitutional depriva-
tion must be determined by a focus of inquiry not limited to the ac-
tions of individuals. The implication of that suggestion-that it is
not proper usage to refer to an individual government official's con-
duct as "unconstitutional"- does not compel a conclusion that the in-
dividual should not be liable for the deprivation. The conduct of in-
dividual officials can, without characterizing that conduct as either
constitutional or unconstitutional, have a causal relationship or "fac-
tual connection""I to a constitutional deprivation even where that
deprivation is defined in terms of the "systematic" obligations of
government. The problem of the liability or non-liability of such an
individual is a problem of remedial policy, including policies of deter-
rence, of fairness to individual defendants, of federalism and of
judicial administration. It is, in short, a question not of constitu-
tional but of statutory duty.
The Individual Defendant As Focus of Analysis Where Government
Is Not the Object of Federal Regulation
The category of cases where the individual, not the govern-
ment, is the object of federal regulation obviously includes those
cases described in the earlier discussion of a statutory extension of
federal regulation to reach individual misconduct. It includes cases,
then, in which no government authorization or policy is inconsistent
with, or a threat to, a constitutional norm or a constitutionally pro-
tected interest, as well as cases in which there exists either a
government remedy for the individual conduct at issue or no
102. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 701-02 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Cf. Thode, supra note 32 (factual connection element in common law tort
analysis).
1981]
Cox: Constiutional Duty and Section 1983: A Response
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
490 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.15
legitimate claim of a constitutional obligation to create such a
remedy."'4 The appropriate analysis in such cases is wholly
statutory. The category may be characterized as that of the true
federal tort. The Constitution provides in such cases very little if
any guidance, because, under the assumptions of the present discus-
sion, the Constitution as such is not violated by the individual con-
duct this category seeks to regulate. Of course, the Court need not
assume that the scope of the federal cause of action is as broad as
the tort law of the states. Indeed, the Court may well restrict the
application of the statute to instances of egregious behavior. There
are excellent policy reasons for limiting this category to
"outrageous" conduct" 5 or to extreme abuses of authority.' If the
proposition that Congress authorized the category as an aspect of
the statute is accepted, the fact remains that the statute does not
by its terms provide substantial guidance. The age of the statute
alone cautions conservative application. But whether construed
broadly or narrowly, the statute remains an invitation to the Court
to formulate its application interstitially.
The second category, where the conduct of individual officials
is at issue, and its relationship to the first category, where the con-
duct of government is at issue, may be illustrated by a brief descrip-
tion of the opinions in Baker v. McCollan,°7 In Baker, the plaintiff
was arrested and incarcerated for a period of a few days because
mistaken for a suspect named in a valid warrant. The Court,
characterizing the claim as essentially one of false imprisonment, re-
104. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 211 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that, if state "authorized" the search in Monroe by declining to remedy the
police conduct there involved, the dictum in Wolf v. Coloardo, 338 U.S. 25, 28
(1949)-"we have no hesitation in saying that were the state affirmatively to sanction
such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Four-
teenth Amendment"-could be applicable). If it is assumed that there was government
conduct present in Monroe-at least in the sense of non-enforcement or of underen-
forcement of state rules-I would place that case in the category of cases, described in
the preceding section, where government is the object of federal regulation. The
remedial question would then be a statutory question, as it is in either category. If
there had been no violation of the warrant requirement in Monroe-that is, if the sole
concern was with the arbitrary conduct of the police in effecting an otherwise valid
search-the problem would be that suggested by Justice Frankfurter's citation of
Wolf: did the government authorize the conduct? That would be a constitutional issue
within the first category. If the state did not "authorize" the conduct, the case would
fall within the second category.
105. See Shapo, supra note 4.
106. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 423-34. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976); note 120 infra and accompanying text.
107. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
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jected a due process theory because, despite the error in identifica-
tion, the plaintiff had been arrested pursuant to a valid warrant and
made no speedy trial claim. The Court nevertheless suggested that
the sheriff-defendant might have been liable under Section 1983 if
he had failed to act "after the lapse of a certain amount of time" in
the face of repeated protests.'08 Justice Blackmun's concurring opin-
ion invoked a substantive due process analysis and argued that the
defendant's conduct was not such as to "shock the conscience"
within the meaning of Rochin v. California"° because it was the
defendant's subordinates, rather than the Sheriff himself, who had
failed to confirm identity."' The dissent in Baker argued that there
was a constitutional violation because there had been no effort to
create an administrative procedure "reasonably calculated to
establish that a person being detained for the alleged commission of
a crime was in fact the person believed to be guilty of the
offense."'
The dissent's argument in Baker properly focused upon the
question of government obligation at a constitutional level of
analysis. Although the majority opinion framed the question as
whether there exists some right to an identification procedure at a
time falling between the issuance of a warrant and the time a
speedy trial is constitutionally required-an issue consistent with a
focus upon government obligation-it also hinted that a sufficient
period of official inaction with knowledge of protest would create an
individual duty of inquiry. The hint suggests a judgment about in-
dividual fault as a matter of constitutional meaning. The concurring
opinion in Baker makes such a judgment explicit: the question, for
Justice Blackmun, was not government obligation, but rather the
reasonableness (or wantonness, or whatever "conscience shocking"
might mean) of individual conduct.
108. Id. at 145.
109. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
110. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 147-48. Justice Blackmun distinguished his
dissent in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 384-87 (1976), on the grounds that the super-
visory conduct in Rizzo had been "reckless." The difficulty with that proposition is
that the Rizzo dissent was grounded not upon the "unconstitutional conduct' of super-
visory officials but upon the liability policies of the statute: "the Court ignores both
the language of § 1983 and the case law interpreting that language." 423 U.S. at 384
(dissenting opinion) (emphasis supplied). Justice Marshall filed a separate dissent in
which he took the position somewhat similar to Justice Blackmun's view-that there
had in fact been a constitutional violation because the defendant's conduct had been
"intentional". Id. at 149.
111. 443 U.S. at 150 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Both the dissent and the major thrust of the Court's majority
opinion in Baker may therefore be characterized as falling within
the first of the categories suggested here. Had the Court's conclu-
sion been that government had an obligation to create an identifica-
tion procedure (a "remedy" for the risk of a deprivation of a con-
stitutionally protected interest in liberty), the question of the
Sheriffs liability would have been a question of remedial policy,
perhaps framable as whether the sheriff had a statutory duty to an-
ticipate government's procedural obligation.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion and the majority's hint
about individual fault are properly assignable to the second
category, where individual, not government, conduct is at issue.
Justice Blackmun therefore improperly invoked substantive due pro-
cess as the basis for decision. As it was clear from the Court's opin-
ion that government had no constitutional obligation, the only re-
maining question was individual obligation. That question does not
sound in the Constitution. It is a tort question properly resolved, if
Monroe's statutory promise is fulfilled, as a matter of federal
statutory or interstitial common law. If one wishes to insist upon
constitutional labels,"2 substantive due process-and much of its
Lochner-era"' baggage-is a far more appropriate vehicle than the
attempt to make other constitutional guarantees and doctrines
"speak" to individuals. But the fact that it is the more appropriate
vehicle ought, for many of the reasons substantive due process was
discredited in the first place,"' to give us substantial pause.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion suggests that there are two alter-
native conceptions of the constitutional tort. The first treats the
Constitution as providing a general guide to protected interests to
be interpreted in a manner which recognizes the limits of its
relevance to individual conduct; it treats the statute-the cause of
action-as the occasion for giving concrete meaning to the protec-
tion when an individual's conduct-or the relationship of individual
conduct to government misconduct-is at issue. The second ap-
proach treats the Constitution as itself having immediate concrete
112. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 423-28. See note 120 infra.
113. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). It is of course apparent that the
Lochner problem is not present to the extent that judicial review of legislative deci-
sion is not present, but the substantive due process problem-the absence of limits on
judicial discretion inherent in a substantive due process theory-is present.
114. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175-77 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
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meaning and as providing, within the four corners of the instrument,
sufficient policy guidance to define its legal consequences. It is cer-
tainly possible to follow the second course-to treat the Constitu-
tion as a part of the fabric of the common law and to treat the Court
as possessing authority to use it as such-but one ought to
recognize the risks inherent in the enterprise.
Although the Court has, in those cases in which it purports to
inquire into something like "constitutional duty," employed the con-
cept to restrict the operation of constitutional guarantees,15 the im-
plication of the second mode of analysis is that the Court is free to
turn the Constitution into a body of federal tort law. A torts deci-
sion limiting liability remains a torts decision, not a constitutional
one.' It is, however, a federal statute that provides the cause of ac-
tion with which we are concerned; and federal statutes and federal
common law remedies "implied" by the Court from constitutional
provisions"7 presumably remain subject to Congressional oversight,
at least to a degree that does not threaten some core minima of
constitutional protection."' Because Congressional reluctance to
amend the Court's conclusions on issues of purportedly constitu-
tional interpretation can be expected to be great,"9 an insistence
upon labeling "tort issues" constitutional issues as a means of enfor-
cing federalism or some other policy not clearly derivable from the
constitutional guarantee in issue is an insistence upon a role and
authority for the Court of substantially more breadth than would ap-
pear from the immediate and superficial thrust of these decisions."'
115. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976);
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
116. Justice Rehnquist's emphatic insistence upon distinction between "tort"
and "constitutional tort" and presumed concern with limiting resort to the federal
courts to the contrary notwithstanding.
117. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
118. See Monaghan, supra note 42. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO, H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM, 330-75 (2d ed. 1973).
119. For an instance of congressional uncertainty and reluctance, see generally
Civil Rights Improvement Act of 1977: Hearings on S-35 Before the Subcommittee on
the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1977) (S-35 in-
cluded a provision purporting to "overrule" Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
120. At least an outline of the argument supporting this point may be seen by
referring to the concept of "abuse of power." For Justice Brennan, Section 1983 is the
source of the concept in this context and is the basis for distinguishing state tort law.
Paul v. Davis, 423 U.S. 693, 717 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For Professor
Monaghan, the concept may be found at a constitutional level in the due process clause
and provides a basis for accomplishing the same end. Monaghan, supra note 10, at
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423-28. But cf. Monaghan, Professor Jones and the Constitution, 4 VT. L. REV. 87 (1979)
(attacking common law conception of judicial function at constitutional level of
analysis). It is, however, not true that abuse of power or authority is unique to federal
law, that tort law is not concerned with "such matters as the nature of the invasion,
its magnitude, and the character of the justification asserted," Monaghan, supra note
10, at 428, or that a return to substantive due process analysis, id. at 433-34; Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring), is a viable solution to
the problem of distinguishing appropriate roles for federal and state law. For analyses
of "common law" concern with abuse, see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Of-
ficers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 214 (1963); SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT,
XVI (1977). In fact the common law and constitutional guarantees do protect similar in-
terests; that is the attraction in treating the Constitution as the basis for common-law
making, and the difficulty in separating the cause of action from the constitutional pro-
visions it seeks to enforce.
But elevation of "abuse of power" by means of an "outrageousness" requirement
to a matter of constitutional doctrine masks the perfectly sensible reasons for using
such a concept- policies of federalism and concern for federal court dockets-and runs
the risk of setting in legal concrete the vaguest of concepts, chiefly useful for its flex-
ibility in a jury trial of tort issues. (Professor Monaghan cites as authority for his sug-
gested standard RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS 46, (1965)). There is of course constitu-
tional authority for the standard, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), but that fact
should give us no comfort. See id. at 175-77 (Black, J., dissenting).
The better course is to make the same "outrageousness" suggestion (if one is
concerned with state's interests to this degree) at a statutory level of analysis, clearly
labeled as such. See Shapo, supra note 4, at 327. Such a course requires a return to the
fundamental question-legislative intent-and, to the extent that question is
unanswerable given the nineteenth century origin of the statute and the difficulty of
providing contemporary relevance to nineteenth century legislative policies, permits
an interstitial judicial development subject to future congressional guidance.
The immediate impulse underlying cases such as Paul and Ingraham-an im-
pulse I take to be that of limiting the scope of the federal remedy-I have no disagree-
ment with. My disagreement is with the level of analysis employed in the limiting.
There is, however, a second disagreement I think worth noting. It is that the impulse
has found expression in terms of the value of federalism. I would submit that it is
more properly framed in terms of a concern for separation of powers as a value-even
as a "constitutional common law" value. It would be improper to conclude that because
Section 1983 is a nineteenth century statute chiefly noteworthy for its dormancy until
1961, it should therefore not be given effect. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) was,
in my view, a decision properly giving effect to a congressional choice of policy. The
breadth of the statute permits, moreover, considerable judicial flexibility in fleshing
out the cause of action. It is not improper to interpret the statute as conferring a com-
mon law making function; the nineteenth century congressional concern was largely
with the inoperation of state common law systems and the breadth of the statutory
language compels such a course. The federalism concern is therefore largely mooted by
the fact of congressional decision.
The fact remains, however, that the statute is nineteenth century legislation
largely designed to deal with an immediate problem-Ku Klux Klan activity in the
South. It is not a proper exercise of judicial interpretive function to treat civil rights
legislation as analogous to the Constitution and to therefore treat that function as per-
mitting judicial decision to take whatever course it will on the theory the Congress
may "correct" judicial error. See Neuborne, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV.
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CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY
What is needed in tie judicial struggle with the difficulty of
giving a nineteenth century statute contemporary meaning is, it is
quite true, a duty analysis, for such an analysis offers the best hope
of satisfying the realist's insistence' upon explication of the real
reasons for decision and of the elaborationist's dream of judicial
discipline."2 But the relevant duty is a statutory duty (undoubtedly
well punctuated by constitutional values), not a constitutional one."
546 (1979) (advocating such treatment). My observation does not mean that Monroe's
holding regarding an official's simultaneous violation of "constitutional law" and state
law need be reexamined or that the congressional purpose need be confined to the im-
mediate crisis which precipitated the legislation. It does mean that the impulse to
judicial conservatism suggested by the cases referenced here has considerable merit.
See Shapo, supra note 4,
I recognize that this article leaves me open to a charge of contradiction- for it
has here been suggested both that a federal common law of tort is authorized by the
statute and that the absence of recent congressional guidance should be factored into
the equation to limit that authorization -and I will plead guilty to that charge to the
following extent: There is a dynamic tension between the polar extremes alluded to
here, a tension reflected in the volumes of jurisprudence devoted to the general matter
of the legitimacy of judicial decision and its control and to the specific matter of
judicial "application" of legislation, which I think both inevitable and desirable. My
observation does not resolve specific cases, let alone "hard" ones, but a recognition of
the tension "in the open" at a statutory level of analysis at least has the virtue of per-
mitting a discourse about the tension within the framework of specific cases, and such
a discourse is preferable to talk of constitutional abstractions.
121. See, Lewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222,
1252-54 (1931).
122. See, Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). I do not intend here to ignore the tensions, e.g., Miller &
Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661
(1960), only to minimize them.
123. After this article went to press, the Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in Parratt v. Taylor, 49 U.S.L.W. 4509 (May 18, 1981). That decision recognizes
that negligence will support a claim under Section 1983, continues to treat the statute
as a mere vehicle for the enforcement of rights to be found in the Constitution, and ap-
plies a procedural due process analysis reminiscent of Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977), to the neligent loss, by prison officials, of a prisoner's property. More
specifically, the Court held that the prisoner was not deprived of property without due
process because the state's post-deprivation remedial structure constituted adequate
process. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4513. The Court's analysis remains, of course, inconsistent
with the analysis suggested here, for it continues to treat the issue of duty at a wholly
constitutional level and appears, again, largely motivated by a fear of a general federal
tort law. Id. Moreover, there does not appear to be significant disagreement on these
points among the members of the Court. See id. at 4515 (Powell, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that deprivations of due process require intent and denying that due process is a
basis for federal review of state tort remedies-a denial that, taken to extremes,
would seem to preclude any liability for failure of supervision and to preclude the con-
stitutional inquiry into the adequacy of state remedial structures advocated here).
Nevertheless, Parratt is interesting because it appears-albeit at the level of
19811
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substantive constitutional doctrine rather than state action theory-to recognize
something like a concept of government authorization of an individual official's con-
duct. The Court, in rejecting the view that a pre-deprivation hearing is required in
cases of negligent deprivation of property, argued that
[ilt is difficult to conceive how the State could provide a meaningful hear-
ing before the deprivation takes place. The loss of property, although at-
tributable to the State as action under "color of law," is in almost all
cases beyond the control of the State.
Id. at 4512. See also id. at 4514 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
The Court's rejection of the argument that a pre-deprivation hearing is required
in cases of an individual official's tortious conduct constitues, in effect, a rejection of a
type of substantive due process theory. Although the pre-deprivation hearing argu-
ment is framed as an argument from procedure, that framing is clearly fictional: the
government has no interest to assert in such a hearing and is in no position to predict
conduct it has not authorized and does not desire. The argument is substantive in the
sense that it operates, in effect, as an absolute constitutional prohibition of tortious
conduct; no one seriously contemplates a pre-tort hearing. The Court is in a position to
speak in such a fictional manner only because its analysis rests upon the further fiction
that the official responsible for the negligent loss of property is the government. If it
is assumed, hypothetically, that the pre-tort hearing argument was accepted, it is at
best difficult to see how that official would go about fulfilling his "constitutional duty"
to grant a hearing.
But the Court's rejection of the pre-tort hearing argument is not, it seems to
me, necessarily a rejection of an argument that the government might have a constitu-
tional duty to implement other forms of pre-deprivation "process"-a process, for ex-
ample, of adequate supervision. Compare id. at 4511 & n.3. with Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362 (1976). The Court's use of the statutory "state action" language in the quoted
portion of its opinion and its apparent recognition that there is a distinction between
the misconduct of state officials and the misconduct of the government, albeit in the
limited context of due process, is at least a step in the appropriate direction of deter-
mining what the government's constitutional duty might be.
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